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The activity carried out by football players during games can be considered as an example of the 
characteristics of a team as understood by Organizational Economics. In this study, the Spanish First 
Division football teams were taken as a sample to evaluate the implemented organisational design. Data 
Envelopment Analysis was used to calculate the efficiency and the variables representing the degree of 
coordination achieved in the games were determined by factor analysis. It can be concluded that there 
are efficient Spanish First Division football teams that have implemented organizational designs leading 
to good team coordination. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The calculation of the efficiency of sports teams using frontier methods is a field of study that has 
certain tradition. However, generally speaking, the suggestion of Lovell (1993, p. 18) to relate the 
efficiency levels achieved to the internal organization of the clubs has not been followed. The main 
contribution of this article resides in the attempt to follow this recommendation using the football teams 
that participated in the First Division of the Spanish football league between the years 2001 and 2010 as a 
study sample. Slack resources, understood as the surplus of productive resources used by the 
organizations with respect to their isoquant, have been used as a link between efficiency and 
organizational design. 
Firstly, the explanations that Organizational Economics and Strategic Management give for the 
existence of slack resources in organizations were considered. In this sense two alternatives were found: 
either slack resources serve to address environmental contingencies and mitigate problems of internal 
coordination, or they can be considered as wasteful. Secondly, the fact that calculations of levels of 
efficiency using frontier methods classify all those organizations that are above their isoquant as 
inefficient, and that the distance from that isoquant is used as a quantification of inefficiency, was also 
taken into account. 
Therefore, the aim of this work is to determine whether the inefficiency observed in First Division 
Spanish football teams is due to an excessive use of resources or whether it could be justified as the use of 
slack resources to solve environmental or coordination problems. Consequently, it would necessary to 
assess whether the activity of football teams reveals any particular characteristics that hinder the internal 
coordination of its members or if they face particularly convulsive environments.  
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Within Organizational Economics, the internal structure qualified as “team” would need a design 
which can result in the use of slack resources. A team is defined as a group of individuals who have a 
decision-making capacity and share the same objective, but based on different information. Given the 
characteristics of a team, it is acknowledged that, leaving to one side the uncertainty caused by random 
events over which it has no control, the results obtained would improve if all of the team’s members 
shared all the available information. However, this implies an increase in the costs of the process, more 
specifically, an increase in the costs of coordination and in the time used to that end. The solution to this 
problem has been described as team design, with one of its alternatives being the establishment of slack 
resources, which implies a reduction in efficiency.  
The representative production function of the activity of a football team can be divided into two 
distinct phases: the activity before a game and that of the game itself. This paper focuses on the second of 
these two phases, since this is where the team´s output is produced and, at the same time, it is where there 
is a greater possibility that the types of problems that slack resources could mitigate would arise. 
The frontier method known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been used to calculate the 
efficiency. This method has the advantage that it does not require the production function to be defined, 
while the classification of any deviation from the frontier as inefficiency is commonly cited as its primary 
disadvantage. However, for the case dealt with in this paper, and adopting the position that all 
inefficiency or distance from the isoquant may be due to two different causes (excessive use of resources 
or the use of resources for resolving problems) and trying to determine which one of these explains the 
case of First Division Spanish football teams, it may be appropriate to start with an inefficiency value 
equivalent to the maximum distance from the isoquant. To apply the DEA in the calculation of the 
efficiency of the football teams, sporting success as represented by the points earned throughout the 
season was taken as the output variable, and offensive plays made and the number of players used in the 
competition, were taken as input variables. Next, variables representing the need for coordination during 
games (plays involving a large number of players and passes, throw-ins and clearances that were received 
by a teammate) and the absence of coordination (plays involving few players, fouls, cards, passes, throw-
ins and clearances intercepted by the opponent ...) were taken and a factor analysis was performed to 
group them and facilitate their use in the last part of the article, which consists in a descriptive study using 
graphs of the relationship between efficiency and coordination for Spanish First Division football teams. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section the treatment that Organizational Economics 
and Strategic Management give to slack resources is presented with the aim of justifying an analysis that 
attempts to determine whether the inefficiency observed in an organization is due to waste or to the need 
for internal coordination or for solving environment-related problems. In the third section, the principles 
of Team Theory are translated to the football team´s activity on the field to demonstrate that the 
coordination and communication problems presented by the theory are present in the sample under study 
and, consequently, the solution also proposed by Team Theory consisting of the use of slack resources 
that reduce efficiency, may have been adopted by some football teams. The fourth section lists the 
methods that DEA provides for calculating the various efficiency concepts and the results obtained for the 
sample are analyzed. In the fifth section, a descriptive analysis is done to determine whether the 
organizational design adopted by football teams to coordinate their play and improve communication 
during games has negatively affected the levels of efficiency achieved. The paper ends with the 
conclusions. 
 
SLACK RESOURCES AND EFFICIENCY 
 
The classic model of perfect competition predicts that no companies will obtain extraordinary profits 
and that resources will be allocated efficiently, i.e. only the quantities strictly necessary will be used and 
in the right combination according to their prices. However, reality frequently contradicts this prediction 
and the results obtained vary among companies because the hypothesis that underpins the model does not 
hold. With regard to the assumptions regarding the performance of the companies themselves, the role 
played by managers is more complex than that foreseen by Classical Economic Theory, according to 
which the task of management is limited to the decision regarding the quantity of product to be produced 
depending on the prevailing market price. 
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The recognition of the role played by managers in the allocation of resources has given rise to 
different streams of research. Thus, according Stoelhorst and van Raaij (2004), Organizational Economics 
tries to answer the question of why firms exist and why they adopt the scale and scope they do, using the 
coordination of economic activity as an explanation, while Strategic Management focuses on the sources 
of competitive advantage that explain the differences in the results among companies. 
On the other hand, Leibenstein (1966) distinguishes between allocative efficiency and what the author 
calls "X-Efficiency". According to his view, allocative inefficiency measures only the impact of price 
distortions and quantities due, for example, to welfare losses caused by monopolies, restrictions on 
international trade, the existence of subsidies or publicly owned companies, but always under the 
assumption that all companies buy and use their resources efficiently. This internal efficiency is what 
Leibenstein (1966) called "X-Efficiency" and would be related to the allocation of managers in the 
companies, a very important aspect taking into account that they determine not only their own 
productivity but also that of their subordinates. For Leibenstein (1966) the three main determinants of X-
efficiency are intra-company motivation, for example via wages, external motivation due to competition 
or the imitation by other companies and the proper use of existing knowledge. 
Ultimately, the conclusion could be that the internal complexity of companies and the consequent 
activity of its managers would explain why inefficiencies in the allocation of resources occur. These 
inefficiencies are understood as the holding of surplus resources in amounts greater than those predicted 
by Economic Theory or, in the words of Kerschbamer and Tournas (2003), the reason why companies are 
situated above the isoquant. 
These surplus resources are what in literature are known as slack resources, which have been defined 
in various ways. Cyert and March (1963, p. 36) indicate that the slack "consists in payments to members 
of the coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization" and state that their existence is 
due to imperfections in the markets for resources. Bourgeois (1981, page 29) defines slack resources as a 
“Cushion of excess resources available in an organization that will either solve many organizational 
problems or facilitate the pursuit of goals outside the realm of those dictated by optimization principles”. 
Although, according to these definitions, slack resources are necessary for the survival of organizations, 
in the literature there is no consensus as to the effects slack resources have on business performance. 
While some authors suggest a positive relationship between these two variables, others suggest a negative 
one. Among the former, Penrose (1959, p. 67) considers that the existence of resources that are not fully 
utilized in current operations are an incentive for companies to find alternative uses for them and employ 
them in expansion. The work of Cyert and March (1963, page 38) can also be included within this group; 
for them slack resources absorb a substantial part of the variability of the environment and play a role in 
stabilization and adaptation thereby allowing organizations to survive under adverse conditions. On the 
contrary, Jensen (1986) argues that in those companies where there is a cash flow higher than strictly 
necessary to finance projects with a positive net present value, managers have incentives to invest 
inefficiently for the organization, since the cash flow may be used to increase the size of the company as a 
means of increasing management power and remuneration. Bourgeois (1981) shows that in some cases 
the slack is treated as a means to ensure the success of the organization while in others it is treated as the 
equivalent of inefficiency. Given this discrepancy, the author suggests that the relationship between slack 
and the success of organizations has an inverted U shape, since it is good up to a certain point and from 
there on it is negative, i.e., the absence of slack is as detrimental to the company as is the presence of too 
many slack resources. 
This lack of consensus has been noted in the literature. Daniel et al. (2004) performed a meta-analysis 
with the aim of finding a generally applicable relationship between slack resources and performance. 
They point out that the discrepancies in the conclusions of the previous studies may be because the 
performance variables proposed have been very diverse and that the influence the slack has on the results 
depends on the type of slack under consideration. 
Regarding the first source of the differences on the effects of slack resources indicated, Wefald et al. 
(2010) indicate that it may be due to the fact that besides the financial results of the companies, as in 
Daniel et al. (2004), slack has also been linked to innovation, internal efficiency, organizational structure, 
risk and knowledge management. Furthermore, both Daniel et al. (2004) and Wefald et al. (2010) agree 
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that research on the relationship between slack and performance should take into account the industry 
type. 
Regarding the different types of slack, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) distinguish between available, 
recoverable and potential slack and Singh (1986) differentiates between absorbed and unabsorbed slack. 
In this respect, when analyzing the relationship between the success of an organization and the assumed 
risk, Singh (1986) takes into account the possibility that different types of slack cause different effects 
and verifies that good results are directly related to slack, both absorbed and unabsorbed. In addition, he 
also tests the indirect relationships between these two variables: on one hand, better results are related 
with greater absorbed slack, which in turn is linked to greater assumed risk; on the other hand, business 
success increases decentralization and decentralization decreases with unabsorbed slack. 
Different functions are attributed to slack resources in the literature. According to Bourgeois (1981), 
slack plays two fundamental roles: resolving problems within the organization and the adapting to 
changing environments. Within the consideration of using slack resources for the resolution of internal 
problems, this author considers that slack plays the role of an incentive, a resource for problem solving 
and a buffer. In the latter case, Bourgeois (1981) cites that Galbraith (1973, page 15) acknowledges, “The 
creation of slack resources, through reduced performance levels, reduces the amount of information that 
must be processed during task execution and prevents the overloading of hierarchical channels.” 
Nevertheless, there are authors that acknowledge an additional function with negative effects for 
organizations. Wefald et al. (2010) distinguish between two different theoretical approaches to explain the 
existence of slack. The first one, aligned with the ideas of Bourgeois (1981), considers that maintaining 
slack resources is beneficial because managers have them available to attend unexpected demand or to 
cope with fluctuations in the availability of key materials; in short, slack resources would be useful in 
situations of uncertainty. The other school of thought suggests that slack in the form of unproductive 
capacity or unnecessary capital expenditure increases the organization´s costs and yields poorer 
performance. In summary, we can adopt the view of Daniel et al. (2004): slack resources can be 
considered as resources to be used to cope in an unpredictable environment or for internal coordination 
purposes in complex organizations, or they may be construed as a misallocation of inputs or wastage.  
For this reason, Lovell (1993, p. 18) indicates the need to use the literature on the internal 
organization of firms to formulate hypotheses concerning variations in efficiency. According to this 
author, the hierarchy, the principal-agent relationship and incentives are relevant when measuring the 
performance of the producers. Furthermore, Organizational Economics and Strategic Management 
literature also takes into account the differences in efficiency as an explanation for the differences 
between companies. Stoelhorst and van Raaij (2004) provide a unifying framework of business 
management theories that explains the differences in firm performance. They conclude there are five 
sources of differences that can be considered and one of them is precisely the difference in the efficiency 
of the business processes1. Moreover, among the theories that Stoelhorst and van Raaij (2004)2 put forth, 
those which correspond with the Chicago School and the Positioning school specifically cite the 
differences in efficiency as the reason for the existence of large firms with extraordinary profits in the 
case of the first and for competitive advantages in the second. Furthermore, according to the Resource-
based school, and by extension, the Competence-based school, differences in performance may be 
attributed to the use of different combinations of productive resources, which would be related to the level 
of efficiency achieved. 
In short, following the ideas of Daniel et al. (2004), managers of organizations strive to achieve a 
balance between efficiency and holding the surplus resources that enable them to react to unexpected 
environmental threats or opportunities. 
In this paper, the games played by Spanish First Division football teams will be taken as a study 
sample to apply the recommendation of Lovell (1993, p. 18) which consists in relating the results of the 
calculation of efficiency with the theories concerning the internal organization of firms. In other words, 
the present article will analyze whether the use of excess resources by football teams is due to the 
improper allocation of inputs or the need for coordination and adaptation to the environment intrinsic to 
this industry. Since the study sample is restricted the suggestion of Daniel et al. (2004) and Wefald et al. 
(2010) is followed and the industry to which the organizations belong is taken account when assessing the 
relationship between slack resources and performance. Furthermore, it would be necessary to know 
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whether circumstances that may be qualified as a need for coordination or adaptation to an environment 
arise during football games. As Jost (2000) and Serra (2001) point out, players interact in a dynamic flow, 
so that coordination is necessary as each player adapts naturally and immediately to game play. In 
addition, Team Theory, which focuses on the mechanisms of coordination of the individuals, can provide 
a theoretical framework for assessing whether the use of slack resources would be justified during 
football games. 
Recent papers are devoted to analyze the relationship between slack resources and some 
characteristics or decisions taken by firms. Salge and Vera (2013) and Vanacker, Collewaert and 
Paeleman (2013) study the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. The first of those 
papers assumes slack resources are necessary to increase learning capabilities which are positively related 
with performance. The second paper analyses the influence of investors as moderators of the relationship 
between slack resources and performance. Mousa and Reed (2013) try to give a value to slack resources. 
Finally, Dosi, Iborra and Safón(2015) and Kim, Cho and Khieu (2014) study the use of slack resources in 
internationalization and innovation activities, respectively. We could say that the present paper follows 
this last approach as we try to analyze the possibility and effects of using slack resources in coordination 
activities by football teams during games. 
 
APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS TO FOOTBALL TEAMS  
 
With regards to the productive process of football teams, Schofield (1988), Carmichael and Thomas 
(1995) and Carmichael, Thomas and Ward (2000) consider a recursive system in which the success of the 
team depends on the performance of the players during the game. This, in turn, depends on both their 
abilities and on the work of the coach. Therefore, applying this to football teams, the production function 
can be considered to consist of two different components, each with its own inputs and outputs: 
- Firstly, the players’ abilities (sporting talent, physical condition and form, experience, etc.) 
can be considered together with the work of the coach (work done during training sessions, 
tactics, line-ups, etc.) as the inputs to a result, which is the team performance during the 
game, i.e. the offensive and defensive plays against the opposing team. 
- Secondly, the offensive and defensive plays (the result of the first component) are taken as 
inputs that are transformed into success during the games, which can be considered as the 
output. 
Moreover, according to Marschak and Radner (1972, p. 4) a team, as understood by Organizational 
Economics, consists of various people who perform different tasks, including the collection and 
communication of information and decision making, but have common interests. The parallel that exists 
between the characteristics of a football team in the second of the production stages, i.e., during a game, 
and those of a team as understood by Organizational Economics, can be observed by the activities of its 
individual members, the existence of common objectives, the influence of the environment on 
performance, the interdependence between individuals and the solutions proposed to solve the problems 
derived from the need to co-ordinate. Each of these points will be considered separately. 
With regards to the activities of the individuals that make-up a team, as understood by Organizational 
Economics, attention should first be drawn to the specialization by tasks and, secondly, to the fact that the 
information available to each of the team’s members concerning the environment is different. In the 
context of football teams, task specialization implies that goalkeepers, fullbacks, midfielders, forwards 
and the coach are not interchangeable with each other, and they each have distinct tasks assigned to them. 
In general terms, it is possible to distinguish between the tasks given to the players and the coach: the 
former interpret and decide the moves to be made during the course of the game on their own account, 
whilst the latter acts by introducing the relevant changes in the team formation. Furthermore, each player 
acquires information about the environment during the course of the game (e.g., the goalkeeper and 
fullbacks with respect to the forwards of the opposing team, and the forwards with respect to the 
opposition fullbacks), which leads to a situation of information asymmetry. 
In the groups that form teams, there is no conflict of interest, and all the team members pursue the 
same objective (Marschak and Radner, 1972, p. 123ff; Radner, 1972, p. 189). According to Mechtel et al. 
(2011), a football team is made up of different members who must cooperate to reach a common 
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objective: to win a football game, although in reality it could be considered a sub-objective of a higher 
one, which would be to win the league championship in question3. 
As Marschak and Radner (1972, p. 126) demonstrate in the utility function that they establish for a 
team, the results depend not only on the decisions of its members, but also on the values taken by the 
variables outside its control, which, for football teams, could be represented by the performance of the 
opposing team. 
Radner (1972, p. 208ff) and Marschak and Radner (1972, p. 126 y 129ff) emphasize that in a group 
characterized as a team under the terms of Team Theory, the interdependence among the individuals 
materializes in the effects that the activity of each individual has on the result obtained by the group as a 
whole. Therefore, to be able to speak of a team, the synergies among its components must be observable, 
i.e., the results obtained by the team must be greater than the sum of the results that would be obtained 
individually by each member acting independently. Furthermore, the activity of each member will be 
considered as optimum, not only in terms of his individual contribution to the result, but also by taking 
into account the decisions adopted by the remaining members. This would require, given the asymmetry 
of information of the environment, an exchange of information, since the overall result of the group 
improves if more information is exchanged and the coordination of activities of the individuals is 
improved, even when this means that a higher cost must be borne. For a football game, the existence of 
synergies cannot be directly evaluated. However, there would appear to be empirical evidence of 
improved results induced by training sessions and implementing rehearsed plays; examples of this are the 
national teams, which carry out extensive training stages prior to championships, or the case of teams 
made-up of players who have not previously played together, which only occurs in charity games4. 
Furthermore, the plays that involve various players are an example of interrelated individual activities and 
the need for an exchange of information. As for the first of these two aspects, the result of these plays 
depends as much on the decisions of each individual player as on those taken by the remaining members 
of the team, and not exclusively on the individual action that culminates the play. With regards to the 
second aspect, the equivalent of the exchange of information in such plays would be the need for the 
participants to agree among themselves in some way (through brief communications, mutual 
understanding or standards of conduct), which in turn would improve the outcome of the play, the result 
of the game and result of the championship, since each player has better information about the situation of 
his area of the field. Moreover, as opposed to other games like basketball, a football game cannot be 
interrupted for an exchange of information between the players, or between the players and the coach, 
with the aim of preparing the plays to be made. When expressed in economic terms, this circumstance can 
be interpreted as a very high cost of information exchange on the playing field, so that the use of other 
mechanisms, such as prior planning and training, becomes fundamental. 
According to Organizational Economics, a team is a group of individuals specialized in different 
tasks and with different information about the environment. The exchange of information and the 
coordination among the individuals improve the overall team performance. Therefore, the problem faced 
by the team is what information should be shared and what should be the coordination mechanism. This is 
the case not because there is a conflict of interest between individuals involved in the negotiation, given 
that they share a common objective, but rather because the transmission of information that increases the 
profits by facilitating the coordination of the individuals, has a cost. All of these circumstances are 
aggravated by the random nature of the exogenous contingencies and the impossibility of predicting them 
in advance. 
To resolve the problems derived from the need for coordination of decision making by independent 
economic agents, the use of the market mechanism has been suggested, given that this provides efficient 
results in many areas of the economy. However, the conditions required for the market mechanism to 
produce desirable results is not present for teams. As a result, it is necessary to establish alternative 
coordination mechanisms, such as establishing rules, programs or procedures that instruct team members 
on how to respond to each contingency. For football games, this would involve establishing common 
tactics developed during the training sessions prior to each game. Similarly, decision centers need to be 
created; during the games, the captain of the team would fill this role, as would the coach, albeit to a 
lesser extent, since he can only give instructions during half time based on his perception of the game5. 
Furthermore, if the environment is characterized by great uncertainty and variability, the group will need 
94     Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 16(1) 2015
to revert to systems implying a high degree of individual judgment. In each game, the circumstances of 
play vary; for example, the rival team is different, and the condition of the field changes from game to 
game. Thus, despite the tactics established by the coach and the exchange of information that may take 
place between players or between the captain and the rest of the team, when making individual plays or 
participating in a collective play, it is the player himself who decides which activity will be performed. 
To cope with all of this, Galbraith (1973) proposes different organizational designs that facilitate the 
transmission and reception of the information necessary for the coordination task. One of these is the 
establishment of slack resources, which absorb the impact of unforeseen contingencies but, consequently, 
allow fewer resources to be dedicated to the anticipation of this contingency and to designing rules or 
procedures to deal with it. The existence of such resources therefore leads to a reduction in the efficiency 
of an organization.  
Therefore, the premise of this study and its justification could be stated as follows: when performing 
the second stage of the production process, football teams show the characteristics of teams as defined by 
Organizational Economics. Consequently, there is a need for coordination that must be solved by an 
organizational design. But this organizational design can be based, or not, on the use of slack resources, 
which produces a decrease in efficiency. This statement relates the levels of efficiency reached by the 
football teams to the organizational design implemented during the game. So, two different situations, 
with different implications and recommendations, can be observed:  
- Situation 1: Highly efficient teams have fewer coordination problems and that the inefficient ones 
do no not implement an organizational design that leads to coordination among its members. 
It follows that the former have implemented an internal design that achieves the coordination of, 
and communication between individuals during the game without using slack resources. In this 
case, the inefficiency observed in the other teams could be classified as a waste of resources. The 
recommendation for the inefficient teams is that it would be possible to achieve a higher level of 
output from the same allocation of resources by changing the organizational design until it is 
similar to that of teams with higher levels of efficiency. 
- Situation 2: The most efficient teams are found to have coordination problems and the rest do not. 
One might conclude that the inefficient ones are inefficient because they have resorted to the use of 
slack resources to achieve the necessary coordination among the individuals during a game. This 
case would indicate a situation that would justify the existence of slack resources by the improved 
coordination and communication among the players during the games, and the teams could choose 
between organizational designs that enhance the coordination of individuals and others that allow it 
to reach high levels of efficiency. 
Since the purpose of this study is not hypothesis testing but the analysis of which of the possible 
relationships between coordination and efficiency is shown in Spanish First Division soccer teams, 
regressions relating the two variables are not estimated, but a graphical representation is used to draw 
conclusions. These graphs consist of coordinate axes with values representative of the coordination and 
efficiency for each unit in the sample. Therefore, the first of the two above scenarios would lead to a 
concentration of observations in the quadrant of both high efficiency and high coordination values, and 
the other concentration of points in the quadrant representing low values for both variables. By contrast, 
the graph for the second situation would show a concentration of units in the quadrant representing high 
efficiency and low coordination and another cloud of points in the opposite quadrant. 
 
EFFICIENCY OF PROFESSIONAL SPANISH FIRST DIVISION FOOTBALL TEAMS 
 
The high cost of information exchange during football games means that the presence of slack 
resources would be more justified here than in other activities. Consequently, the classification of a 
football team as efficient in a given competition cannot be based on theoretical standards or on averages 
that use data from other industries as a reference; rather, it must be based on the values that reflect the 
activity of football teams with similar characteristics. Thus, a possible excess use of resources can be 
evaluated and, consequently, whether or not the organizational design adopted is appropriate, taking into 
account the restrictions imposed by the rules of the game itself or any other circumstances that affect all 
football teams in the course of the game. Frontier functions may be especially appropriate as a tool to use 
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for calculating efficiency for the case in question, since they calculate the efficiency of one unit in 
comparison to the values of the production activity of a sample that is as homogenous as possible. 
Frontier functions measure efficiency with respect to the best observations and correspond to 
optimization processes. There are a number of different approaches within these types of models, which 
have been summarized in Førsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980). In the empirical section of this paper, we 
will employ deterministic non-parametric frontiers, also known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
These types of models do not establish a specific functional form for the frontier, but they are formed 
through linear programming techniques, such as the envelopment of the observed values. Companies on a 
frontier established in this way are classified as efficient. As Farrell (1957) indicates, the most significant 
aspect of this method is not the graphical representation of the isoquant, but the mathematical formulation 
via a linear programming problem such as the following:  
 
P.1.   Min  1i 
  s.t.   u  z U 
    1i xz X 
   Rk z   
where i is the total technical efficiency index considering an orientation towards the input (which means 
that a unit is technically efficient if it is not possible to reduce the use of one of its factors without 
increasing the use of any other resource or without reducing the amount of any product) and constant 
returns to scale, u is the vector that represents the amounts of the m products produced by the company, U 
is the k.m matrix representing the amount of m products for k companies in the sample, x is the amount of 
the n production factors used by the company whose efficiency is being measured, X is the k.n matrix of 
the amounts of the n production factors used by the companies in the sample, and z is a vector of 
parameters that determines efficient combinations of factors and products against which the efficiency of 
the organization being analyzed is evaluated. When i = 1, the company being analyzed lies on the 
isoquant and it is impossible to obtain its production vector with a radial reduction of all its resources.  
Since the aim of the analysis is not only to identify those Spanish First Division football teams that 
efficiently utilize their resources on the playing field, but also to establish the relationship between 
efficiency and organizational design by analyzing whether the inefficiencies detected are due to the use of 
slack resources for coordination purposes or due to waste, inefficiency should be classified as all 
deviations from the frontier, which is what the DEA does. On the other hand, the efficiency ratio values 
are used as a variable to be explained in a further analysis. 
As stated by Lovell (1993, p. 53), a 2-step procedure can be used to explain the factors that influence 
the efficiency of a business sample in the following manner: first, the efficiency values of the sample 
under consideration are calculated, and then a regression is estimated whose dependent variable is the 
efficiency value calculated in the previous stage. However, according to this author, the inconvenience of 
this method is that the efficiency variable values are bounded, which means that they need to be 
transformed, or the appropriate econometric techniques applied, before being used as a dependent 
variable in a regression. Tortosa-Ausina (2003) recommends the use of Tobit regressions, and this is the 
procedure followed by Drake and Simper (2003) to explain the differences in the efficiency achieved by 
the police in different parts of England and Wales. However, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) calculate the 
efficiency of local Belgian governments using various models and limit the use of the Tobit regression to 
those cases where efficiency values come from bounded models, and use an OLS estimate for the rest. 
This is why a method for calculating the efficiency that yields unbounded values was chosen; that being 
the modified version of the DEA proposed by Andersen and Petersen (1993), which allows for the 
calculation of the value known as super efficiency. The efficiency values obtained by this modified 
version do not have a maximum value equal to unity, as in the traditional DEA, so they can be used at a 
later stage of analysis without the problems that arise from using a bounded dependent variable. Using a 
modified Data Envelopment Analysis with a view to using a regression appears in Lovell, Walters and 
Wood (1994). 
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The Andersen and Petersen (1993) modified version of the DEA allows for discrimination and 
differentiation among the different efficient units and, if constant returns to scale are assumed, consists in 
solving the following linear programming problem for them: 
 
P.2.   Min  i 
  s.t.   u  z U* 
   i xz X* 
   R  z 1-k  
where u is the vector representing the quantities of the m products made by the efficient company under 
analysis, U* is the matrix of range (k-1).m, representing the quantities of the m products for the 
companies considered in the sample, and for which the one under analysis is excluded, x is the amount of 
n productive factors used by the company whose efficiency is being measured, X* is the matrix of range 
(k-1).n of the quantities of the n inputs used by the companies in the sample, excluding the company 
being studied, and z is a vector of intensity parameters that determine the combinations of factors and 
products that are efficient,  i.e. that are situated on the isoquant and serve as a reference for the calculation 
of the efficiency of the organization under study. Since the reassessed efficient unit is not included in the 
reference sample of this problem, the super efficiency value, which is the ratio i can take on values 
greater than one. Thus, the efficient units now have a different efficiency value where, obviously, the 
higher the value, the more efficient the company can be considered to be. The interpretation of i 
according to Andersen and Petersen (1993), is the proportion by which the amount of productive 
resources could be increased and the company analyzed still be considered efficient. 
To measure the efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis, the variables and resources considered 
as possibly being representative of the product have to be determined. The analysis undertaken in this 
study is centered on the second of the previously mentioned components of the production function, and 
the choice of variables closely follows the proposals of Espitia-Escuer and García-Cebrián (2004, 2006 
and 2008) who also analyzed the efficiency and productivity of Spanish First Division football teams. In 
our study, success in the competition is considered the output variable, whilst those variables representing 
offensive play and the performance of the players is considered input.  
Regarding the measurement of output as success in the competition, Dawson, Dobson and Gerrard 
(2000) indicate that a draw is a common game result, and the League rules allow for this result, with no 
obligation to find a way of determining a winner or loser for each game. Therefore, they consider the 
number of points accumulated during a season as a variable that conveniently measures a football team’s 
results, since its calculation includes the three possible results of a game (win, lose or draw), and each 
result is rewarded with a different number of points. This study does not consider the number of goals 
scored as an output variable, because a team´s final standing in the league depends not on this, but on the 
difference between goals scored and goals conceded.  
As variables representative of offensive play, we considered the number of offensive plays, the 
number of minutes during which the teams had possession of the ball and the number of shots and 
headers. The decision of not include defensive moves as input is due to the fact that all teams have to play 
against each other twice in the Spanish First Division, so the influence of the opposition can considered to 
be homogenous throughout the sample. In addition, following Espitia-Escuer and García-Cebrián (2010), 
offensive plays are considered to produce sporting success, i.e., they contribute to obtaining the output of 
the organizations studied, while defensive plays are aimed at adapting to the environment and, therefore, 
do not qualify as resources that enter into the production process of football teams. 
In addition, the human factor is a production resource present in all activities, so we have also 
included the number of players as part of the input that characterizes the second part of the production 
function of a football team. The justification for using the number of players without differentiating 
between them by their characteristics can again be found in Espitia-Escuer and García-Cebrián (2010), 
where the authors state that the differences between the individuals is one of the reasons why different 
levels of efficiency are observed among organizations. 
The period taken for this study is the seasons between 2001 and 2010 and the data used was provided 
by Opta Sports. Values of global technical efficiency and super efficiency are calculated by taking the 
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data for each of the Spanish First Division football teams individually in each of these seasons. A 
summary of the results is in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE EFFICIENCY VALUES OBTAINED 
 
 Total technical efficiency Super efficiency 
Maximum 1.0000 1.3360 
Minimum 0.3715 0.3715 
Average 0.7526 0.7655 
Standard Deviation 0.1555 0.1803 
 
The data presented in Table 1 show that the average total technical efficiency and super efficiency are 
similar for the sample studied, but the results for super efficiency show a somewhat greater dispersion as 
the efficient units have values greater than unity. Moreover, the reason that the minimum value is 
identical for both is due to the fact the only difference in the values obtained is shown for the efficient 
units. 
 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR EFFICIENCY AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO 
FOOTBALL TEAM ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN 
 
To detect whether the inefficient use of resources by football teams in developing their game is due to 
the use of slack resources as a solution to the problems of organizational design or due to waste, a factor 
analysis was performed as a first step. This takes a comprehensive set of actions as explanatory variables 
which indicate a high degree of coordination among team members on the field of play (such as good 
passes, goal kicks and clearances that reach a team-mate or plays involving a large number of players). 
Conversely, it also considers those reflecting poor coordination (e.g., a loss of possession, substitutions, 
made, poor passing, goal kicks and clearances that reach an opponent or plays in which few players 
participate). All of these variables have been taken for the span of the study, i.e. for the seasons between 
2001 and 2010. 
After eliminating all those variables with a high correlation, the factor analysis determined that the 
explanatory variables to be considered in the study are those shown in Table 3. Of these, the variables 
considered as indicative of coordination among team members are plays involving 7, 8 or 9 players. The 
variables proposed as indicative of poor team coordination are fouls committed, yellow and red cards 
received and play involving 1, 2 or 3 players. 
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TABLE 2 
SUPEREFFICIENCY VALUES OBTAINED BY THE EFFICIENT FOOTBALL TEAMS 
 
Season Team Super efficiency 
2001/2002 Valencia 1.1632 
2002/2003 Madrid 1.0191 
2002/2003 Real Sociedad 1.1268 
2003/2004 Deportivo 1.1436 
2003/2004 Valencia 1.1678 
2004/2005 Barcelona 1.0904 
2004/2005 Madrid 1.1651 
2005/2006 Barcelona 1.1149 
2005/2006 Osasuna 1.1103 
2006/2007 Barcelona 1.1364 
2006/2007 Madrid 1.0856 
2006/2007 Sevilla 1.0192 
2006/2007 Valencia 1.0045 
2007/2008 Madrid 1.0922 
2007/2008 Villarreal 1.1173 
2008/2009 Atlético Madrid 1.0224 
2008/2009 Barcelona 1.1584 
2008/2009 Madrid 1.0693 
2008/2009 Villarreal 1.0406 
2009/2010 Barcelona 1.3360 
2009/2010 Madrid 1.1447 
 
Table 2 shows the super efficiency values for teams considered efficient in each one of the seasons 
studied. The team with the highest super efficiency value is Barcelona in the 2009/2010 season, which is 
also reflected in Table 1. 
 
Principal component analysis was used as an extraction method in the factor analysis performed and 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization was used as a rotation method. The results grouped the explanatory 
variables in four factors, also shown in Table 3. The first represents the coordination of the team during 
games, as it is composed of all the variables that reflect this situation with a positive weighting. The 
variables for the second factor indicate poor coordination among the players; they all have a positive 
weighting. Therefore, this second factor is considered to represent a lack of coordination in football 
teams. The factor analysis revealed a third factor that consists of the number of fouls committed. There 
was also a fourth factor consisting of the number of cards received, which could be interpreted as a lack 
of sportsmanship for the team. However, since the variables that compose them had been characterized as 
being representative of poor coordination, the reasoning to explain the relationship that these factors may 
have with efficiency is similar to that followed for the factor representing the lack of coordination. 
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TABLE 3 
RESULTS OF THE ROTATED COMPONENT MATRIX 
 
 
Factor 1 
Coordination 
 
Factor 2 
Lack of 
coordination 
Factor 3 
Fouls 
committed 
Factor 4 
Cards received
 
7 players 0.95    
8 players 0.94    
9 players 0.93    
1 player  0.81   
2 players  0.92   
3 players  0.90   
Fouls committed   -0.91  
Yellow cards    0.74 
Red cards    0.59 
 
The aim of this study was not to verify a theoretical hypothesis, but to determine if the inefficiency of 
the football teams in the sample could be explained by the implementation of an organizational design 
that achieves the coordination of the players on the field through the use slack resources. To determine 
this, the relationships between the four factors that, according to the results obtained capture the 
explanatory variables of the degree of coordination between players during the games and the efficiency 
ratios achieved by Spanish First Division football teams, have been plotted. To ensure that the 
comparisons are coherent, both the efficiency and factor analysis results were obtained by considering the 
information from each one of the seasons separately. Both total technical efficiency and super efficiency 
were taken as efficiency variables. The ratios for the latter are not bounded, so there is a possibility that 
for this variable the graphs will show a stronger relationship between efficiency and coordination than for 
the values of global technical efficiency. 
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FIGURE 1 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VALUES OF TOTAL TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND 
THE FACTORS OBTAINED 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows global technical efficiency related to factors representing coordination, and it can be 
seen that the highest concentration of inefficient teams occurs around the low values for the factor 
representing coordination and high values for the factor that includes variables related to the lack of 
coordination. However, the efficient teams are distributed along almost the entire range of variation in the 
values of the factors representative of coordination and its absence. 
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FIGURE 2 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES FOR SUPEREFFICIENCY AND THE FACTORS 
OBTAINED 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, in which the relationship between super efficiency ratios and factor values shows, 
obviously, the same situation for inefficient teams. However, since it discriminates among the efficient 
ones, the trend represented by the red line shows a higher positive correlation between efficiency and 
coordination and a greater negative correlation between efficiency and the lack of coordination, since its 
slope is steeper than in Figure 1. 
The relationship between any of the efficiency variables considered in this study and the factors 
representing fouls and cards received, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 is nonexistent, as both inefficient and 
efficient teams are distributed throughout the entire range of variation of the values of these factors, with 
no concentration of units being seen. 
Consequently, the analysis shows that the inefficiency of Spanish First Division football teams is not 
explained by an organizational design that uses slack resources to achieve coordination among the players 
on the field of play, as there are efficient teams with a high coordination. Moreover, in the figures 
analyzed, there is a concentration of inefficient teams around the low values of the factor representing 
coordination and the high values for the factor representing lack of coordination. However, the results do 
not fit any of the situations that, a priori, were seen as possibilities: either greater inefficiency with better 
coordination (coordinated inefficient teams and efficient teams with problems of coordination) or 
otherwise (coordinated efficient teams and inefficient teams with coordination problems). The results 
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obtained show inefficient teams with coordination problems, so their inefficiency could be described as a 
waste of resources, but not all efficient teams show a lack of coordination problems, as there is an 
additional group to be added to the two possible situations established theoretically: efficient teams with 
an organizational design leading to a lack of coordination among its players. Consequently, since 
inefficiency cannot be explained by the use of a better organizational design, but rather to a waste of 
resources, inefficient teams could be recommended to make better use of their productive resources and to 
“imitate” efficient teams. However, among the latter there are teams with an organizational design that 
drives the proper coordination of the players during the games, and teams where this is not the case. 
Therefore, an additional criterion could be considered when making recommendations to inefficient 
teams. 
Efficiency values the absence of a wasteful use of resources, but this study assumes that the purpose 
of football teams is to achieve good sporting results. Therefore, efficacy, defined as the degree to which 
the organization’s aims are reached, may be an additional criterion to take into consideration when 
making recommendations for Spanish First Division football teams, in the light of the results of this 
study. 
Table 4 shows the positions reached in League competitions for efficient teams in the sample, 
together with their values for the factors representing coordination of the players on the field and for the 
lack of coordination. Teams with players whose actions on the field could be considered as more 
coordinated are those that have a high value for the first factor and a low value for the second. If we 
consider that values above unity for the first of these factors indicate coordination between team members 
during a game, it can be seen that the champions for the seasons studied have a higher value than this, 
with the exception of seasons 2001/2002 and 2003/2004. In addition, Real Madrid had a value greater 
than 1 for the coordination factor in the seasons 2004/2005, 2006/2007 and 2009/2010 when it finished in 
second place. On the other hand, the negative values could be considered as low values for the factors 
representing the lack of coordination among team members and the champions for all the seasons studied, 
with the exception of 2003/2004 have values below zero for the second factor. This was also true for 
Deportivo in the 2003/2004 season, Real Madrid in 2004/2005 and 2009/2010, Villarreal in 2007/2008 
and 2008/2009 and Atlético Madrid in 2008/2009. In short, in view of the results obtained in this study, it 
could be said that the only teams to show high values for the factor representing coordination together 
with low values for the factor representing lack of coordination are the champions for each of the seasons 
studied (except for Valencia for the two seasons that it won and Real Madrid for the two seasons that it 
finished second). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
During the course of a football game, it is difficult to exchange information, especially between the 
coach and the players. As a result, and given that not all individuals have perfect information about their 
environment, there are offensive plays and periods of possession that do not result in an increase of output 
obtained as measured by points scored during the competition. Furthermore, injuries, suspensions and 
other random events can contribute towards the use of a higher number of players than that which is 
considered efficient. Applying Organizational Economics and Strategic Management to football teams, it 
could be said that the organizational design - which allows for information exchange between the players 
during the course of the game so that their actions can be coordinated - uses part of the resources to 
moderate the effects of unforeseen events. These slack resources are thus not directly involved in 
achieving the result, so efficiency suffers. 
In this study, we measured the efficiency of professional Spanish First Division football teams to 
evaluate their organizational design. More specifically, we measured their efficiency in the productive 
stage carried out during the games played in the league for the seasons covering the period from 2001 to 
2010. We applied DEA methodology to calculate values for total technical efficiency and super 
efficiency. 
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TABLE 4 
VALUES FOR THE COORDINATION AND LACK OF COORDINATION FACTORS FOR 
EFFICIENT TEAMS IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Season Team Final League position  
Coordination 
factor value  
Lack of 
coordination 
factor value 
2001/2002 Valencia Champions -1.02 -2.61 
2002/2003 
Madrid Champions 1.93 -0.41 
Real Sociedad 2nd 0.70 0.56 
2003/2004 
Deportivo 3rd -0.32 -0.50 
Valencia Champions -0.17 0.05 
2004/2005 
Barcelona Champions 1.82 -0.68 
Madrid 2nd 1.73 -1.17 
2005/2006 
Barcelona Champions 2.13 -.025 
Osasuna 5th -0.21 0.25 
2006/2007 
Barcelona Champions 3.57 -0.19 
Madrid 2nd 1.89 0.20 
Sevilla 3rd -0.44 1.16 
Valencia 4th 0.03 0.63 
2007/2008 
Madrid Champions 1.50 -0.27 
Villarreal 2nd 0.75 -0.09 
2008/2009 
Atlético Madrid 4th 0.83 -0.07 
Barcelona Champions 3.45 -0.60 
Madrid 2nd 1.67 0.01 
Villarreal 5th 0.50 -0.16 
2009/2010 
Barcelona Champions 4.19 -0.68 
Madrid 2nd 3.16 -0.10 
 
 
The second stage consisted of a factor analysis to group the variables representing coordination and 
good communication of the players on the field of play, and the absence thereof. Finally, graphs of the 
relationship between the efficiency levels of the Spanish First Division football teams and the 
coordination achieved through the implementation of organizational design were plotted. 
Leaving aside the possibility that the football teams analyzed in this study did not show any 
relationship between efficiency and coordination from a general point of view, one would expect two 
possible outcomes: 
104     Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 16(1) 2015
 Efficient teams are well coordinated on the field of play and inefficient teams apply an 
organizational design where its team members are more individualistic. 
 Efficient teams lack coordination in their play while inefficient ones are coordinated. 
The first case indicates an organizational design that provides adequate communication between 
players without the use of slack resources. Therefore, any inefficiency identified would not be explained 
from an organizational design point of view, and the practices employed by efficient teams would be 
recommended for them. The second case would show that, at least in the sample taken under 
consideration, good coordination among the players during the games is only achieved using slack 
resources and, consequently, the inefficiencies observed would be justified by the implementation of an 
organizational design leading to better coordination. 
The results of this study show that inefficient teams have low levels of coordination, and among the 
efficient teams, there are both those with a coordinated play and those with an individualistic game. 
Therefore, savings in resources of the efficient teams is not related to coordination, and organizational 
design does not affect the efficiency achieved, as there are teams that do not use slack resources to 
achieve coordinated play.  
In empirical studies calculating the efficiency of a series of organizations, the recommendation for 
inefficient ones is not to squander the resources they have, and to imitate the production processes of 
efficient organizations. In this study, by linking the level of efficiency achieved with the organizational 
design implemented to achieve good coordination among the players, two types of efficient teams were 
obtained: the coordinated and the individualistic. Therefore, when making recommendations to inefficient 
teams, one needs to consider which is better: should they imitate and try to become coordinated efficient 
teams or individualistic efficient teams. To help answer this question, one must make use of an additional 
criterion, and this study has opted for efficacy, which is defined as the attainment of the objectives set by 
an organization. This study considered the aim of football teams to be the maximization of sporting 
results and, by relating the coordination achieved by efficient teams and their standing in the Spanish First 
Division, it was found that efficient coordinated teams were at the top of the table for the time period 
covered by this study. In conclusion, by uniting the criteria of efficiency and efficacy, it would appear 
that inefficient teams should use their resources productively while, at the same time, adopting an 
organizational design that provides adequate communication and coordination among the players. 
Therefore, the role played by the first phase of the production process of football teams should be 
emphasized. It is here where the talent and hard work of players and the coach are combined to prepare 
the plays to be performed on the field; where the foundations of the organizational design are set for the 
style of play that will be implemented in the games played. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. The other four are: positional advantages in product markets, unique or otherwise costly-to-copy resources, 
innovative capabilities and a superior learning capability. 
2. Organizational Economics includes transaction cost theory, agency theory, Industrial Organization theory, 
the Schumpeterian view, the Chicago School and the resource-based view. Of all of these, the first two 
consider, as does Neoclassical Economic Theory, that firms allocate their resources efficiently and 
therefore do not explain what could be the sources of differences in efficiency. They also differentiate 
between four schools within Strategic Management: the Planning School, the Process School, the 
Competence-based School and the Positioning School. Stoelhorst and van Raaij (2004) emphasize these 
last two, since they study the content of the strategy, i.e. the nature of successful strategies versus the others 
that analyze the strategy process, or in other words, how the strategy should be developed. 
3. This work assumes that the aim of football teams is to maximize sporting performance, compared to other 
authors who consider the maximization of economic benefit of sports clubs as its purpose. This can be seen 
in Fort and Quirk (1995), Szymanski (2003), Sandy et al. (2004), Fort (2006), Késenne (2007) and García 
del Barrio and Szymanski (2009). 
4. This provides an additional justification for the division into two stages of the productive process of soccer 
teams: the conditions necessary for a soccer team to be identified as a team according to Organizational 
Economics are established in the first stage, in such a way that the theory can be used to analyze the second 
stage of the productive process. 
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5. Thus, it could be concluded that during soccer games both alternatives to the market are used in a 
complementary manner. 
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